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AbstrAct
In the last decade, the economic crisis and the mistrust 
in democratic institutions have contributed to a major 
crisis of political parties across Europe. These are some 
of the causes that led to the formation of political move-
ments with purely populist characteristics as replace-
ment of the traditional delegitimized intermediary bod-
ies. The crisis of representation is the crisis of the post 
1945 idea of representation as a tool to increase the 
people’s participation. We have noted a convergence 
between some populist appeals to direct democracy 
and the more radical neo-liberal approaches that pre-
tend to reduce people’s participation, even if by appeal-
ing to some forms of “surrogate representation”. The 
theoretical background of this paper is based upon the 
relationships between “surrogate representation” and 
the institutionalization of the neo-populist movements, 
quickly transformed in neo-populist parties. In other 
words, we can highlight the strange coming together 
of technological storytelling on direct democracy with 
technocracy myths and the overlap of technopopulism 
with direct democracy and “direct e-democracy” (that is 
profoundly different from deliberative and participatory 
e-democracy).  The aim of the paper is to analyse the 
connections between the emerging forms of populism 
(such as techno-populism), the rhetoric on the impor-
tance of digital communication for the improvement of 
democracy, and the depoliticisation processes.
Keywords
Depoliticisation; e-Democracy; Hyper-representation; 
Populism; Technopopulism.
resumen
En la última década, la crisis económica y la desconfian-
za en las instituciones democráticas han contribuido a una 
gran crisis de los partidos políticos en toda Europa. Estas 
son algunas de las causas que llevaron a la formación de 
movimientos políticos con características puramente po-
pulistas como reemplazo de los organismos intermediarios 
tradicionalmente deslegitimados. La crisis de la represen-
tación es la crisis de la idea de representación posterior 
a 1945 como una herramienta para aumentar la partici-
pación popular. Hemos notado una convergencia entre 
algunos llamamientos populistas a la democracia directa 
y los enfoques neoliberales más radicales que pretenden 
reducir la participación de la gente, incluso si apelamos 
a algunas formas de “representación sustituta”. Los an-
tecedentes teóricos de este documento se basan en las 
relaciones entre la “representación sustituta” y la institu-
cionalización de los movimientos neopopulistas, que se 
transformaron rápidamente en partidos neopopulistas. En 
otras palabras, podemos destacar la extraña unión de na-
rraciones tecnológicas sobre democracia directa con mitos 
de tecnocracia y la superposición de tecnopopulismo con 
democracia directa y “democracia electrónica directa” (que 
es profundamente diferente de democracia electrónica 
participativa y deliberativa). El objetivo del documento es 
analizar las conexiones entre las formas emergentes de 
populismo (como el tecopopulismo), la retórica sobre la im-
portancia de la comunicación digital para el mejoramiento 
de la democracia y los procesos de despolitización.
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IntroductIon
At the end of 2017, the Cambridge Dictionary 
declared “populism” its 2017 word of the year. At 
the same time, the dictionary defined populism as 
“political ideas and activities that are intended to 
get support of ordinary people by giving them what 
they want”. In an article published by The Guardian 
on 7 December 2017, Cas Mudde added, “Oddly 
enough, this is almost identical to the interpreta-
tion used by many populists themselves”. Mudde 
continued to describe his idea of populism as an 
“ideology that considers society to be separated 
into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 
‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’ and argues 
that politics should be an expression of the vo-
lonté générale (general will) of the people”. The 
Dutch political scientist contested the Cambridge 
Dictionary’s choice, saying that “nativism” should 
be considered the most appropriate “word of the 
year” (https://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2017/dec/07/cambridge-dictionary-nativism-
populism-word-year). The word “populism” has also 
been used by politicians and the mass media in a 
derogatory way, synonymous with demagogy. This 
use of “populism” is simplistic and not scientifically 
useful: in fact, it cannot be operationalized. 
The aim of this article is to identify how different 
definitions of populism can be framed within the defi-
nition of populism as an effect of hyper-representa-
tion. It also aims to better understand some of the 
new emerging trends of contemporary populism, 
such as that of so-called techno-populism. Therefore, 
in this article, we will attempt to highlight the connec-
tions between the emerging forms of populism (such 
as techno-populism), the rhetoric on the importance 
of digital communication for the improvement of de-
mocracy, and the depoliticisation processes (togeth-
er with consequent re-politicisation trends).
The term “populism” has been discussed at 
length academically, and several definitions and 
analytic frameworks of the topic have been of-
fered in the last four decades. We have considered 
the most frequently used definitions of populism, 
from the very influential work of Margaret Canovan 
(1981) to the recent theorizations of Cas Mudde 
(2004) and Paul Taggart (2000). Among these defi-
nitions, we can highlight a) the idea of populism 
as a political communication style and/or a set of 
discursive practices (Taguieff 2002; Jagers and 
Walgrave 2007; Moffitt and Tormey 2014); b) the 
concept of populism as a political strategy framed 
in certain kinds of organizations (Weyland 2001; 
Betz 2002; Kriesi 2015); c) Mudde’s conceptualiza-
tion of populism as a “thin” ideology (Mudde 2004; 
Kriesi and Pappas 2015; van Kessel 2015), a fre-
quently discussed and interesting definition; d) the 
idea that “populism is neither the authentic part of 
modern democratic politics nor a kind of pathol-
ogy caused by irrational citizens”. It is the “perma-
nent shadow of representative politics”, as argued 
by Müller (2017). We propose to use another ap-
proach that – even if it is compatible with other the-
oretical definitions –is based upon the concept of 
hyper-representation (Mastropaolo 2016; Fasano, 
Panarari and Sorice 2016). 
1. PoPulIsm As hyPer-rePresentAtIon
Populisms are often interpreted as responses 
to the lack of participation that would distinguish 
liberal representative democracies. The deficit in 
popular participation and the connected rising of 
neo-populist parties are also based on the aware-
ness of the crisis of representation. We should also 
consider, however, the acceleration in the decline 
of political parties’ credibility as a result of the 2007 
economic crisis that affected the Eurozone also pro-
duced a wave of movement parties, which obtained 
a vast electoral success1. The crisis of a neoliberal 
approach to economy that spread from the United 
States to Europe, indeed, combined with a crisis of 
traditional parties led to two contrasting trends: a) 
on the one hand the growing of the far-right popu-
list parties, and b) on the other, the emergence of 
movement-parties (della Porta 2015; della Porta, 
Fernández, Kouki and Mosca 2017)2. The first 
ones have shown some traditional characteristics 
of right-wing populism, such as an anti-immigration 
rhetoric and a substantial anti-system approach to 
politics; the second ones have highlighted an anti-
establishment frame, not necessarily anti-system. 
The movement-parties are not necessarily “popu-
list”; in some cases, in fact, they do not use the 
distinction between “the people” (us) and the “non-
people” (them), preferring a distinction between the 
economic élites and the “exploited” people (as in 
the famous slogan “we are the 99%” that, also from 
a linguistic perspective, designates a counter-po-
sition of the “majority” of people against a rich and 
powerful “minority”). As Müller (2017) points out, 
there is a marked difference between, for example, 
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who at a 
party congress responds to the opponents: “We are 
the people. Who are you?” and social movements 
contrasting the élites but accepting pluralism. 
Populism moves in the wake of hyper-representa-
tion and it is, for this reason, also fundamentally 
anti-pluralist. The progressive erosion of long-term 
identities upon which parties’ legitimization was 
founded has also put in crisis the established forms 
of political participation. 
Populism represents an appeal to the people in 
a political order in which the people are formally al-
ready the sovereign (Urbinati 2013: 145). In other 
words, populism should be situated within repre-
sentative democracy3. The crisis of representation 
is substantiated by an agency deficit that is evident 
POPULISMS AMONG TECHNOLOGY, E-DEMOCRACY AND THE DEPOLITICISATION PROCESS . 3
RIS  [online] 2018, 76 (4), e109. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.005
in the diminished centrality of political parties and by 
a request for an increasingly less fiduciary and more 
sanctioning representation. In fact, the trust rela-
tionship between the representative and the repre-
sented has been replaced by a systematic lack of 
trust in which the representative is subjected to the 
continuous control of her/his work: in this context, 
the re-emergence (in the populist rhetoric) of “recall” 
(present in some countries and already active in the 
USSR during the Stalinist era) and the contempo-
rary detriment of the so-called “non-imperative man-
date” are no coincidence.4
The crisis of representation is partly mitigated by 
the emergence of forms of surrogate representa-
tion5. In this case, the latter constitutes a moment 
of potential synthesis between the forms of “exit” 
and those of “voice”. In other words, in addition to 
social apathy there are at least two other possibili-
ties for “voice”: on one side is the populist appeal as 
a sort of “claim for representation” (Saward 2010), 
and on the other side is a voice often consisting of 
the most advanced experiences of democratic in-
novations (De Blasio and Sorice 2016; Smith 2009; 
della Porta 2013). The populist response to the risk 
of exit, however, consists of a substantial concep-
tual overlap between “delegates” and “trustees”, of 
the constant appeal to direct democracy and, of-
ten, of the adoption of plebiscitary (and sometimes 
authoritarian) leadership6. The synthesis of these 
variables produces the phenomenon known as hy-
per-representation (see figure 1). In this case, the 
emphasis on participation – reduced mainly to the 
practices of direct democracy – usually dissipates 
in the plebiscitary appeal for the legitimization of 
the leader (supreme representative of the peo-
ple) against all others (the non-people). From this 
perspective, hyper-representation is also strongly 
connected with the idea of populism as the “hy-
pertrophy of popular sovereignty” (Bickerton and 
Invernizzi Accetti 2017, p. 337).
The development of hyper-representation7 has 
also been made possible because of the crisis of 
public bureaucracies, which is also one of the struc-
tural causes of the crisis of Western Democracies 
(Sintomer 2011). The affirmation of new public 
management has accompanied the lightweight 
state rhetoric, which is very often used as a tool 
to speed up the crisis of democratic institutions 
(Crouch 2003: see table 1). This process has 
served as a pretext for populists’ appeal against 
the lack of participation in representative democra-
cy, but at the same time, it has strongly supported 
the emergence of new sub-forms of populism, such 
as the so-called technopopulism (Bickerton and 
Invernizzi Accetti 2017, Deseriis 2017; De Blasio 
and Sorice 2018). 
Figure 1.
From the crisis of representation to the hyper-representation
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In this situation of crisis within organized political 
representation, one ideological element of neo-pop-
ulist parties resides precisely in the attempt to del-
egitimize representation, which means being elimi-
nated in the face of opportunities offered by “bottom-
up” participation. The latter, however, seems to be 
limited to the practice of direct democracy (which is 
based upon the principle of aggregation: della Porta 
2013) and it is meaningfully opposed to the logic of 
participatory democracy or methods of deliberation. 
Additionally, the emphasis of some populist move-
ments on the presumed libertarian effect of technolo-
gies is not surprising; this position is not so different 
from that proposed by neo-liberal populism, in which 
the confidence in technological efficiency shifts to-
wards the exaltation of the technocracy. 
The emergence of specific forms of populism such 
as the technopopulism and the affirmation of certain 
keywords (identity, citizenship, meritocracy, etc.) seem 
to be elements of a more general process, namely, de-
politicisation (Jaeger 2007; Wilson and Swyngedouw 
2015; Fawcett, Flinders, Hay and Wood 2017).
2. dePolItIcIsAtIon And cItIzenshIP
When Colin Hay published his influential book 
Why We Hate Politics in 2007, the linkage between 
anti-politics, certain tendencies of populism and the 
process of depoliticisation became clear and shed 
new light on some trends in the neo-liberal turn. 
Additionally, several political-institutional innova-
tions (and some institutional re-shaping) that may 
facilitate the growth of participation (such as the 
experiences of collaborative governance, declina-
tions of e-government and different tools of public 
consultation) have been absorbed within processes 
of the anesthetization of popular participation in fa-
vour of a marked increase in representation logics, 
which, in many cases, are perceived by the people 
to be elitist and inevitably top-down. Not coinciden-
tally, certain state reforms have gone in the same 
direction; in other words, even some aspects of 
democratic innovations have been used as tactics 
and tools for the affirmation of the neo-liberal pro-
ject. The expression “tactics and tools” was used by 
Flinders and Buller (2006) and concerns the “mech-
anisms used by politicians to depoliticize issues—
including delegation, but also the creation of binding 
rules and discursive preference shaping” (Fawcett, 
Flinders, Hay and Wood 2017).
The relationships between the depoliticisation 
process and the two (sometimes) converging phe-
nomena of anti-politics and populism constitute 
an important theoretical point of reference for re-
Table 1.
The (d)evolution of democracy according Colin Crouch
Source: Sorice (2014).
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searchers. “Anti-politics overlaps with depolitici-
sation where public disengagement is concerned, 
manifested in declining public participation in elec-
tions and parties, as well as acquiescence to domi-
nant paradigms of public policy” (Ibidem). However, 
the slippery concept of anti-politics8 can be con-
nected to insurgent populist politicians, whose 
dominant slogans concern their capacity to replace 
“exhausted” politics with more “authentic” govern-
ing skills (which include, in many cases, minimal 
governance action) (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013). 
From the perspective of this minimal governance 
action, we can also observe the emergence of the 
so-called “post-politics”, which can be defined as 
“the reduction of the political to the economic – the 
creation of a ‘welcoming business environment’, 
which inspires ‘investor confidence, and provides 
the economic guarantees deemed necessary for 
‘strong and stable markets’. This subordination is 
not only ideological, but is embodied in concrete 
institutional forms, including the privatisation of 
central banks; the imposition of austerity on the 
instruction of the International Monetary Fund; the 
subordination of national legislation to the juridical 
regimes of the World Trade Organization and other 
multilateral organisations; the translation of corpo-
rate agendas into public policy through close formal 
and informal cooperation with business networks; 
and the delegation of numerous decision-making 
powers to non-state o quasi-state institutional 
forms” (Wilson and Swyngedouw 2015).
Post-politics, as a specific space for depoliticisa-
tion, can also favour the rise of anti-political trends. 
Further elements of the facilitation of anti-political 
tendencies and of the affirmation of phenomena 
such as technopopulism are, in fact, constituted by 
the progressive shifting from government to gov-
ernance. This passage – which is strongly present 
in the rhetoric and in scientific approaches of new 
public management – has often been associated 
with the idea of “innovation” and, at least from a 
rhetorical point of view, represented the capacity 
for “common” citizens to govern their daily lives. 
The underlying idea of this rhetoric is that the gov-
ernment (and, with it, politics as a strategic activ-
ity) are matters for the political élites, while govern-
ance, which develops at a micro-territorial level, 
would allow greater control by citizens. In reality, 
the shifting from government to governance deter-
mines an even smaller weight for citizens, which is 
often confined to the management of important but 
subordinate issues, while strategic questions – also 
because of the loss of centrality of political parties 
– have firmly landed in the hands of technocracies 
and of large economic-financial corporations. In 
other words, “the shift from ‘government to govern-
ance’ refers to a passage or direction of travel from 
traditional ‘top-down’ bureaucracy to networks and 
markets and other distinctive modes of governing, 
while ‘anti-politics’ refers to disengagement from 
and disenchantment with traditional forms of politi-
cal organization and participation. The literature on 
depoliticisation investigates the ‘nexus’ between 
these trends by seeking to develop a better under-
standing of how the political character of decision-
making is displaced. The literature on governance 
and political participation contributes to the inter-
est in depoliticisation by suggesting that trends 
towards the latter are likely to take on a different 
form in recent years, given changes in the way 
governance works and the different ways citizens 
participate in that process” (Fawcett, Flinders, Hay 
and Wood 2017). An interesting example provid-
ed by Burnham (2001) was taken up by Fawcett, 
Flinders, Hay and Wood (2017): “Tony Blair’s New 
Labour government in the UK created a process of 
‘depoliticisation’ through which otherwise conten-
tious neo-liberal reforms were presented as ‘inevi-
table’ through delegation to arm’s-length agencies, 
leading to apathy, disillusionment, and ultimately 
submission among the electorate”. In other words, 
depoliticisation becomes a “bridging concept op-
erating at the nexus between micro-trends (the 
disengagement of individual citizens), meso-level 
institutional mechanisms and reforms (modes 
of governance), and macro-level ideologies and 
dominant growth models” (Fawcett, Flinders, Hay 
and Wood 2017).
Flinders and Buller (2006: 299) consider – above 
all variables – globalization, neo-liberalism and 
new public management as micro-political-level 
variables of the depoliticisation process. This pro-
cess, according to Hay (2007), can lead to public 
disaffection and produce social apathy or, we can 
add, some forms of “exit”. One of these forms is 
the refusal of the liberal representation, which was 
replaced by new forms of hyper-representation and 
populism.
Sørensen and Torfing (2017) argue that govern-
ance is a preferential road towards depoliticisation 
as an element of a strong and efficient neo-liberal 
strategy. From this perspective, some tendencies 
towards deliberative democracy, some experiments 
of democratic innovations and even some outcomes 
of e-government and e-democracy should not be 
considered as products of politicisation, but rather 
as tools to depoliticize decision-making processes 
(Urbinati 2014). Even the idea of the centrality of 
experts as guides in certain experiences of collabo-
rative governance would, in this dimension, prove 
the centrality of the power of technocracy. This phe-
nomenon, together with the lack of representation, 
the absence of political control by citizens and the 
lack of an articulated public debate, produces a sub-
stantial “alliance” among the processes of depolitici-
sation and the onset of populism. 
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Figure 2.
The relationships of depoliticisation, neo-liberal ideology and some forms of populism
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This phenomenon is also the background of some 
“deformations” of open government (De Blasio and 
Sorice 2016) and its implicit exaltation of digital tech-
nologies. The rhetoric of digital technologies for par-
ticipation has been strongly present in Italian politics 
in the last few years, and it has been de facto legiti-
mized by the new centrality assumed by the public 
participation platforms used by the state to promote 
open government. Technology can also play a role in 
renewing old mass parties (now often liquid and stra-
tarchically presidentialized) and new ones (straddling 
franchise models and genuinely participatory trends). 
Generally, digital technology can play a role in improv-
ing “efficiency”. With this in the background, we must 
remember that one of the rhetorical arguments that 
accompanied the advance of neo-liberalism found a 
keyword in “efficiency”. An efficient state requires a 
strong executive at the centre and has no need for 
the red tape of parliamentary procedures: this argu-
ment leads to the idea that parliaments should re-
duce their competencies (or perhaps even disappear 
or be replaced by more “lightweight” institutions). The 
links between technopopulist rhetoric and neo-liberal 
populism are evident here and are framed from the 
perspective of depoliticisation (see figure 2).
Another important theoretical point to consider con-
cerns the notion of citizenship, which can be conceptu-
alized as “status” or as the set of civic knowledge. It is 
not random that the populist appeal looks for legitima-
tion in the concept of citizenship as status (Italy: “Prima 
gli italiani!”, UK: “The English first!”, and Switzerland–
Ticin: “Prima i nostri!”; many other similar examples 
can be found in the European scenario). In the first 
case, citizenship is ascriptive: in many cases, repre-
sentative democracy and direct democracy are both 
anchored to the idea of citizenship as status, and this 
is also the premise in which the neo-liberal ideology is 
rooted (Mastropaolo 2000). In the second case, the in-
clusiveness of people with civic knowledge constitutes 
the basic point of reference for affiliative citizenship. 
From this perspective, participatory democracy – pro-
vided that it is not limited to a simplistic practice – can 
represent a sort of counter-hegemonic tool; the idea of 
participation in decision-making processes as a social 
right is, in fact, one of the key concepts traditionally 
used by left-wing political parties.
3. Four tyPes oF PoPulIsm
It is important to note that there is a specific differ-
ence between populist parties and populist rhetoric; 
the former have determined characteristics and very 
often present authoritarian or presidentialized leader-
ships in the frame of hyper-representation; the lat-
ter is a discursive strategy and it can also be used 
– more or less frequently – by non-populist parties 
and/or leaders. The consideration presented here 
originates from the first outcomes of forthcoming re-
search on populist political parties and populist po-
litical leaders in some European countries.9 We have 
identified four predominant types of populism which 
present points of contact with the many studies de-
veloped across Europe. Those four types (neo-liberal 
populism, social populism, national populism, and 
techno-populism) have several common characteris-
tics (see Table 2). Among these, we must highlight 
the emphasis on the centrality of direct democracy 
and the insurgence of hyper-representation logic 
(albeit with different forms) and with the (significant) 
exception of social (or democratic) populism in which 
only areas of the radical left and antagonistic social 
movements are located. It is no coincidence that only 
the latter segment explicitly refers to participatory de-
mocracy, clearly identified as an alternative to liberal 
democracy and conveniently descended from direct 
democracy (on parties and movements against aus-
terity, see Porta, Fernández, Kouki and Mosca 2017). 
It should also be noted that in this area, anti-estab-
lishment rhetoric almost completely replaces the an-
ti-system position (typical, for example, of right-wing 
and ethnic populisms). To this extent, it can be useful 
to highlight that the post-Marxist left-wing parties and 
the radical left10 across Europe are characterized by 
a strong anti-establishment – but not necessarily an-
ti-system – position (Damiani 2017; Zulianello 2017).
Observing Table 2, we can schematically underline 
several relevant aspects.
1. The presence and substantial resilience of two 
types of penal populism (Anastasia, Anselmi and 
Falcinelli 2015). The first derives from the clash 
between the rule of law and the “rule of the peo-
ple”, while the second is accompanied by con-
servative rhetoric of “law and order”.
2. The existence of figures concerning the corrup-
tion of the élites and/or the government and the 
lack in efficiency of the politicians. These figures 
are transversally presented in all four types of 
populism.
3. The presence of technopopulism, where tech-
nology is defined from mostly a positive and op-
timistic perspective, as in many of the techno-
libertarian dreams of the possibilities given to 
democracy by the new digital technologies.
4. The emerging key figure of “meritocracy”, a load-
ed and controversial term, used by politicians in 
several different ways and sometimes from an 
ideological perspective. The concept of “meri-
tocracy” and the related semantic constellation 
are present in different ways in different types of 
populism, although they are mainly an ideologi-
cal mean. As Jo Littler stated in 2013, “we should 
pay close attention to meritocracy because it 
has become a key ideological means by which 
plutocracy – or government by a wealthy élite – 
perpetuates itself through neoliberal culture. It is 
not, in other words, merely a coincidence that 
the common idea that we live, or should live, in 
a meritocratic age co-exists with a pronounced 
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lack of social mobility and the continuation of 
vested hereditary economic interests” (see also 
Littler 2018).
5. The presence of sovereignist populism. Its rela-
tionships with the concept of national community 
and, in general, with exclusionary populism have 
been launched and supported by new right-wing 
parties. Even if the anti-system perspective can 
be implemented by right and left parties mutual-
ly, we have noted a strong discursive difference 
between left-wing parties and right-wing parties 
regarding the concept of sovereignty. Left-wing 
parties usually define sovereignty as constitu-
tional popular control, whilst right-wing parties 
(and especially far-right movements and parties) 
translate sovereignty into exclusionary sover-
eignism. Some similarities also exist between 
exclusionary populism the so-called national/
ethnic populism.
6. The logic of “us vs. them” (which is very com-
mon in the populist appeal). In this perspective, 
we can use Weyland’s conception of populism. 
Having presented the “people” as the “los-
ers” of modernization (and of globalization), he 
identifies the “élites” with the old political class. 
Indeed, populist supporters consider oligarchies 
to be the exploiters that have caused their pre-
sent woes. Therefore, strong attacks against the 
perceived (or existing) oligarchy have a double 
function: they enhance the populist leader’s im-
age of authority to their electors while contrib-
uting to eroding the opponents’ legitimacy. The 
individuation of a political enemy is necessary 
to unify their support, as John Thompson (1995) 
has rightly pointed out, which illustrates the tools 
through which ideology works. It is not surprising 
that populism emerges in times of crisis: in such 
cases, allegedly inept and corrupt political lead-
ership often becomes the first target of popular 
anger, thereby conveying the populist message 
(Weyland 1996). 
7. The strong call for the need to save the Christian 
roots (or at least “traditional” identitarian roots). 
Most present in the right-wing populism, this re-
ligious argument is used jointly with the rhetoric 
of defending national sovereignty: this defence, 
however, is usually symbolized by the narration 
of contrast to the “invasion of migrants”11.
8. The adoption of anti-political rhetoric. It seems to 
be another distinctive characteristic of populism. 
Anti-politics are only a populist rhetoric that 
feeds on the clash between “us” and “them”: we 
the real people against the political institutions 
dominated by bureaucracies; we the people 
against the state who exploits citizens through 
taxes; we the people against the political parties 
dominated by the “casta12; we the simple peo-
ple against the intellectuals and professors13, the 
other side of the oppressing “casta”. 
9. Elements and rhetorical figures of social pop-
ulism in some radical left-wing formations and 
even in new civic aggregations (those that we 
can define as the outcome of the re-politicisation 
of the post-political). According to some com-
mentators, typical elements of social/democratic 
populism can be found in the Spanish political 
party “Podemos”.14
Table 2.
Four types of populism
Neo-liberal populism Social populism (democratic) National populism (ethnic) Techno-populism
Basic 
elements
•Free market
•No intervention of the State 
in economic issues
•People as tax-payers
•Direct democracy
•Techno-libertarianism
•Hyper-representation 
(technical skills possession, 
technocracy)
•Egalitarianism
•Anti-capitalism
•People as workers and/or 
“excluded”
•Direct democracy as 
possibility, participatory 
democracy as practice
•Technology as a tool
•Diffused representation
•Ethnic position
•Xenophobia
•People as nation (imagined)
•Religious traditions
•Direct democracy
•Hyper-representation 
(authoritarian leaderism)
•Emotional figures
•Egalitarianism through 
the Internet
•People as “social 
community”
•Direct democracy
•Techno-libertarianism
•Hyper-representation 
(technical skills 
possession, anti-élite 
technocracy) 
Key figures
•Political élites are corrupted
•Government is corrupted, 
politics is non-efficient
•Individualism
•Meritocracy as ideology
•Rule of law vs rule of the 
people (penal populism)
•Capitalist élites are 
corrupted
•People as collective entity
•Listening to the people
•Popular sovereignty
•Rule of law
•Migrants as enemies
•Christian roots
•Authoritarianism and national 
sovereignty (sovereignism)
• “Law and order” (penal 
populism)
•Anger
•Political élites are 
corrupted
•Government is 
corrupted, politics is 
non-efficient
•Rule of law
•Meritocracy as 
ideology
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It is important to avoid confusing anti-political rhet-
oric with populist style. While anti-political rhetoric is 
strongly connected with populism, populist style is 
not necessarily a symptom of populism. At the same 
time, we can also consider anti-political rhetoric as an 
indicator of a populist discursive style.
Table 3 is our partial re-elaboration of the indica-
tors used by Roberta Bracciale and Antonio Martella 
(2017), analysing the relationships between Twitter 
and political leaders. The importance of the media (and 
the digital media) for the study of populism is widely at-
tested. “The contribution of the media to the establish-
ment of a ‘populist Zeitgeist’ in the twenty-first century 
appears to be threefold (…) the function of politically 
educating the citizenry (once played by mass parties) 
is now largely delegated to the national media, which 
in turn favours those telegenic politicians who speak 
in slogans and soundbites” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 
2008). The indicators of populist style can be very use-
ful to evaluate populist strategies without framing all of 
them in the same definition of “populism”. 
We can affirm that anti-political rhetoric adopts a 
mechanism of ideological unification. In other words, 
anti-politics is absolutely ideological even when it 
adopts discursive strategies against party “ideolo-
gies”. At the same time, anti-political discourse main-
tains a strong relationship with the many faces of the 
depoliticisation.
Anti-political rhetoric is also characterized by the 
recourse of “newism” against the “old” (obviously rep-
resented by the “non-people”) and by a constant ref-
erence to specific keywords. Among those, we must 
highlight the importance of terms such as efficiency 
and privatization, the concept of short-termism (vari-
ously declined), the many forms of newism, the insur-
gence of the rhetoric about the meritocracy and the 
centrality of technology.
Among the four types of populism, we have dedi-
cated a special focus to the emergence of technopo-
pulism and its relationships with e-democracy. 
4. between technocrAcy And 
techno-lIbertArIAnIsm: the 
emergence oF technoPoPulIsm
Technopopulism represents a major emerging “in-
novation”, even though the relationship between pop-
ulism and technology is not new in the European politi-
cal scenario. Several commentators have suggested 
that the old opposition between left and right may have 
been replaced by the “cleavage” between populism 
and technocracy (Freeland 2010). We suggest looking 
at this topic from another perspective: on one hand, 
the opposition between technocracy and techno-lib-
ertarianism15, and on the other, the relationship be-
tween populism and technocracy. “Technocracy holds 
that there is only one correct policy solution; populism 
holds that there is only one authentic will of the peo-
ple” (Müller 2017). This statement means that both, 
in a certain way, refuse democratic debate and can 
be interpreted as an outcome of the depoliticisation 
process. They are, in other words, another aspect of 
the post-political era: an effect of depoliticisation and a 
new form of re-politicisation through technology.
Table 3.
Indicators of populist style
Indicators of populist style Characteristics
Anti-political rhetoric Anti-system, anti-State, anti-parties, anti-intellectuals
Emotionalisation Sharing emotions or revealing insights (Mazzoleni et al., 2003; Van Santen & Van Zoonen 2010)
Informality Adopting a direct, simple, non-formal and non-institutional style (Moffitt & Tormey 2014)
Instrumental actualisation Exploiting specific events in order to support political bias and applying incorrect inductive reason-ing (cherry-picking fallacy) based on current events (Krämer 2014) -> post-truth tendency?
Intimisation Recounting his/her own life (Stanyer 2012)
Negative affect Appealing to emotions of fear or using apodictic registers to arouse interest, alarm and mobilise people on negative feelings (Alvares & Dahlgren 2016) -> Anger
Simplification Oversimplifying issues and solutions (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016; Caiani & Graziano 2016)
Storytelling • Narrating politics• Meritocracy (as a key to go beyond the “corrupted élites”)
Exaggerations The frequent recourse to proverbs, stereotypes, clichés and other expression of “popular wisdom”’ 
Taboo breaker Breaking “taboos” and fighting against political correctness (to distinguish oneself from the élite) (Caiani & Graziano 2016; Krämer 2014; Moffitt & Tormey 2014)
Victimhood
• Politicians considering people as not ready to understand their proposals 
• Politicians focusing on presumed conspiracies against them, when they have not achieved their 
programmes
Vulgarism Using vulgar language to reach “ordinary people” (Mastropaolo 2008) 
Source: Bracciale and Martella (2017) with integrations and modifications.
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Figure 3 illustrates the complicated relationships 
between the oppositional pair of “technocracy and 
techno-libertarianism” on one side, and the converg-
ing pair of “technocracy and populism” on the other. 
As shown in Figure 2, the rhetoric on e-government 
and several forms of e-democracy essentially de-
rives from techno-libertarian instances, but the 
presence of technocratic tendencies is also evident, 
particularly through the new public management 
approach to the re-shaping of governance. New 
populism, particularly neo-liberal populism, shows 
a strong connection with the technocratic approach 
(that is, at the same time, a target of some popu-
list parties and movements). The myth of online di-
rect democracy is an outcome of direct democracy 
(one of the measures proposed by populist parties 
to replace the “declining” representation system); 
it is not connected with the idea of deliberative e-
democracy. It is considered an opportunity (mainly 
arising from democratic participation platforms) to 
develop “real” direct democracy (online) at a low 
cost and without party interference.
We agree with Chris Bickerton and Carlo Invernizzi 
Accetti (2017) that “far from being political opposites 
(or even correctives) for one another, populism and 
technocracy can only be understood – and there-
fore tackled –together-, as parallel expression of the 
same underlying set of phenomena” (Bickerton and 
Invernizzi Accetti 2017: 327).
The rhetoric of digital technologies for participation 
has been present in Western democracies for the 
last few years, and it has been de facto legitimized 
by the new centrality assumed by public participation 
platforms used by the state to promote open govern-
ment. However, we should also note that communica-
tion and digital media seem to give new opportunities 
for political inclusion, from e-voting technicalities to 
the computerization of organizational infrastructure 
and the circuits of parliamentary decision-making 
until the creation of a new public sphere centred on 
discursive and participatory and deliberative practic-
es. Technology, in other words, can also play a role 
in the renewal of old mass parties (now often liquid 
and stratarchically presidentialized) and new ones 
(caught between franchise models and genuinely 
participatory trends). It is also important to be precise 
about the different perspectives on e-government 
and open government. There is not just one model of 
e-government; we can consider at least three differ-
ent models, as highlighted by Table 4.
Figure 3.
The relationships between technocracy, techno-libertarianism and populism
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In the managerial model, the prevailing commu-
nication logic is top-down and essentially monologi-
cal; if a two-way communication model is present in 
the consultative model of e-government, it is only in 
the participatory one that communication presents 
a dialogic dimension. The new forms of open gov-
ernment should theoretically be framed in this third 
model and should also decline towards deliberative 
and participatory forms of e-democracy. In reality, the 
new public management approach has empowered 
the managerial model of e-government, creating a 
strange situation in which a tool created to improve 
social participation has been transformed into a new 
element to increase apathy (“why participate if we are 
only responding targets and not protagonists in poli-
cy making?”). It has also been noted that very often, 
there is conceptual overlapping among open govern-
ment, e-government and e-democracy in European 
public policies on institutional reshaping and digital 
participation (De Blasio and Sorice 2016). On the 
other hand, this overlapping is absolutely natural if e-
democracy is conceived as a tool to make consulting 
people (and voting / e-voting / i-voting) more efficient 
and not as a tool for active political participation16.
At this level, we can observe peculiar convergence 
between technocracy and techno-libertarianism, as 
graphically shown in Figure 4.
One of the effects of populist discourse is reduc-
ing open government to its managerial model (ef-
fectively eliminating its innovative dimension) and 
e-democracy to a simplistic tool of direct democra-
cy through the Internet. In other words, it presents 
evidence of depoliticisation. Technopopulism can at 
least be defined as the belief that the ‘government 
of the people, by the people, for the people’ (Lincoln 
1953 [1863]) is achievable by means of informa-
tion and communications technology. The term be-
lief denotes here an ideology, not in the Marxian 
sense of false consciousness, but in the Althusserian 
sense of a set of ideas that have a material exist-
ence (Althusser 1971). Technopopulism can also 
be understood in Foucauldian terms as an emerg-
ing discourse (Foucault 1972), that is, as a body of 
knowledge, norms, attitudes, and practices that arise 
from the hybridization of two pre-existing discourses: 
populism and techno-libertarianism” (Deseriis 2017: 
441). Marco Deseriis also distinguishes between two 
variants of technopopulism: “a technocratic and lead-
erless variant, which pursues and enacts meritocratic 
forms of democratic participation; and a leaderist, 
more strictly populist, variant wherein charismatic 
leaders play a critical role in conferring unity and 
identity to their parties” (Ibidem). The two variants 
are linked, in different ways, to the emergence of the 
“platform-parties”.17
Table 4.
Models of e-government
Models of e-government Main characteristics
Managerial 
•	 ICT as a tool for information
•	 No interactivity
•	 Top-down communication
Consultative 
•	 ICT as a tool for improvement of public policy
•	 Interactivity with specific stakeholders 
•	 Two-way communication, managed by public administrations 
Participatory 
•	 ICT as a tool for democratic innovation
•	 Broader interactivity
•	 Horizontal communication (dialogic dimension)
Source: Reddick 2011; De Blasio 2014.
Figure 4.
Convergence between technocracy and techno-libertarianism
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Technopopulism can be considered a basic element 
of new trends of depoliticisation. If social populism – 
in Laclau’s (2005) perspective – can represent a re-
politicisation tool, technopopulism constitutes a way to 
strengthen the depoliticisation process in Western de-
mocracies. The tools of democratic innovation (such as 
e-democracy, particularly a truly deliberative e-democ-
racy) can reinforce democratic participation; however, 
they often do the opposite, becoming effective enhanc-
ers (directly or indirectly) of populist tendencies.
notes
1. The political parties’ crisis obviously has many causes; 
certainly, a very important one is represented by the 
redefinition of cleavages on which traditional parties 
founded their own legitimacy and their collective iden-
tity. It is no coincidence that “high / low” or “centre / 
peripheral” fractures are more suitable today to explain 
new social conflicts. 
2. The economic crisis has been aggravated by the fact 
that it was recognized just as a debt crisis derived from 
the public debt of peripheral EU countries, without un-
derstanding all the variables of the problem. European 
citizens (and not only) have been discussing the role of 
formal democratic institutions and of political parties, 
considered too passive to[compared to?] the interna-
tional institutions, without the power and the abilities to 
act in an independent and sovereign way.
3. The concept of representation is traditionally linked to 
two reference poles: on one hand, the electoral dimen-
sion, and on the other, the notion of participation. In 
fact, this connection is relatively recent and finds its 
roots in the “democracy-election” connection, which is 
ideological. See Manin (2012), or how James Madison 
(1787) judged democracy as “a show full of troubles 
and disputes”, or also the analysis of van Reybrouck 
(2016) who analyses the elective method as a power 
control system by economic oligarchies, legitimated by 
the popular vote. See also De Blasio and Sorice 2018.
4. The Italian Constitution, for example, holds that the 
members of Parliament have a “non-imperative man-
date” (or “free mandate”) to guarantee their independ-
ence from political parties’ oligarchies. A campaign 
to instate an “imperative mandate” was launched by 
the Five-Star Movements before the 2013 National 
Elections.
5. Mansbridge (2003) stated that the traditional idea of 
representation as delegation co-exists with three other 
forms of representation that are pervasively present in 
democratic systems: a) anticipatory representation, b) 
gyroscopic representation and, c) surrogate represen-
tation. She considered these forms as “cumulative” and 
“complementary, not oppositional” (ivi: 526). Surrogate 
representation concerns the interests hidden beyond a 
specific electoral constituency. It “plays the normatively 
critical role of providing representation to voters who 
lose in their own district” (ivi: 523). 
6. A variation of authoritarian leadership occurs when 
politicians define themselves as “new”: this situation 
constitutes an example of “top-down populism” or 
“governmental populism” (Revelli 2017: 26).
7. According to Alfio Mastropaolo (2015) the phenom-
enon of hyper-representation arises from the symbolic 
deconstruction that has struck the traditional parties 
and their internal organization. This “destabilization of 
representation” has produced various effects, among 
which the most evident is that of “hyper-representa-
tion”. This destabilized representation is a liberalized 
representation: different social actors, also favored by 
the media, occupy the public scene and function as 
agents of symbolic representation, often claiming the 
agency of social groups. The hyper-representation is 
based on the hyper-pluralism of the societies in which 
we live but at the same time it nourishes that hyper-
pluralism. The concept of hyper-representation is also 
connected with the notion of “representative claim” as 
used by Michael Saward (2010).
8. The concept of anti-politics has been defined by schol-
ars and researchers in several ways. As for “populism”, 
it is a loaded term that is very often used (particularly 
in the media frame) as a denigrating word. Here, we 
use the concept of anti-politics in a merely instrumen-
tal way, as done by Fawcett, Flinders, Hay and Wood 
(2017): “public disillusionment and disengagement, as-
sociated with declining turnout at elections, declining 
membership of parties and political movements, and 
public opposition to paradigmatic policy agendas”.
9. In that research, which is not the purpose of this arti-
cle, we have combined a) a content analysis on po-
litical parties (based on parties’ documents and their 
election manifestos, mainly using evaluative assertion 
analysis); and b) a secondary analysis of leaders’ dis-
courses.
10. “Radical left” is an ambiguous term, as it designates 
both Marxist/post-Marxist parties and new politi-
cal forces such as Podemos in Spain. The semantic 
meaning of the expression can also vary in different 
geographic contexts: Jeremy Corbyn, for example, has 
been defined by newspapers both as a “radical leftist” 
and a “traditional social-democratic leader”. The term 
“radical left” should be used with caution.
11. The use of religion is much more about “belonging” than 
about “belief” and revolves around two main notions: 
restoration and battle. The restorationist discourse is 
based on a specific idea of culture as a set of codes 
(theoretically opposed, for example, to the definition of 
culture used by the British Cultural Studies or the con-
cept of diaspora as used by Stuart Hall). Restoration 
is also based on the idea of the need for a battle to 
defend “nation” or “territory” from “alien” religions. This 
battle, anyway, more strongly concerns borders and 
economic factors than practices of faith. See Marzouki, 
McDonnell and Roy (2016).
12. The term “caste” is suddenly being used everywhere in 
journalism to emphasise the separateness (and privi-
lege) of “professional politicians”.
13. Anti-intellectual rhetoric relied on the development of 
a new media hegemony that Massimiliano Panarari 
(2010) appropriately terms sub-cultural hegemony. 
The de-legitimisation of intellectual work is ideologi-
cal and tends to side-line argumentation in favour of 
shouting spectacles, replacing the principle of author-
ity with the “principle of majority”. It is an international 
phenomenon: see, for example, the anti-intellectual 
statements of Donald Trump (Leonid Bershkidky on 
Chicago Tribune of 14 November 2016: http://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-don-
ald-trump-revolution-elites-intellectuals-20161114-sto-
ry.html). For a taxonomy of anti-political rhetoric, see 
Sorice 2014.
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14. The Spanish party is often associated with the Italian 
Five Star Movement; it would be correct to underline 
the many differences between the two political aggre-
gations. There are in fact considerable differences in 
terms of a) specific constituencies of the two parties 
(Segatti and Capuzzi 2016); b) the internal organiza-
tion and the policy proposal process; c) their political 
assets (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; Vittori 2017).
15. Techno-libertarianism is rooted in the cyber-punk cul-
tures. Its most known theorist are the cyber-activist 
John Perry Barlow who wrote a “declaration for the 
independence of cyberspace” (https://www.eff.org/it/
cyberspace-independence), the founder of Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, John Gilmore, and the US scien-
tist Thurman John Rodgers who strongly supported the 
so-called “laissez-faire capitalism” (Friedman, Mackey 
and Rodgers 2005).
16. From this perspective, it is also possible to analyse oth-
er aspects of depoliticisation, from philanthropocapital-
ism (Wilson 2015) to cosmopolitanism and multipolar-
ity (Jaeger 2015).
17. The party-platform can develop within participatory 
logic but can also be placed in the frame of hyper-
representation. In the latter case the leader (supreme 
representative of “the whole” people) creates a sym-
bolic connection with the “super-people”. In this frame 
an individualistic conception of participation is evoked 
and the emphasis on direct democracy delegitimises 
any forms of participatory democracy.
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